Public Choice: Politics without Romance

Buchanan’s own short summary of what public choice theory did. Its move was to drop the assumption that people in government are motivated differently from people anywhere else, and to model politicians, bureaucrats and voters as self-interested actors responding to incentives. The consequence, he argues, is that market failure is not an argument for state action until you have also modelled how the state will behave — and that the interesting constraints are constitutional ones, chosen before you know which side you will be on. A free full text is available at stephenhicks.org.

Why it’s on the list: It opens the Public Choice Theory section — the field’s founder stating the premise in a dozen pages, which is why a curriculum would put it first rather than a treatise.

Where I saw it: On Brendan McCord’s Philosopher-Entrepreneur Reading List, in the section on Public Choice Theory, saved to Kyle’s “Books To Read” Apple Note. The full 211-entry transcription lives on The Philosopher-Entrepreneur Reading List.

Connections

• Government — the institution the essay models as an ordinary set of incentives.
• Economics — the method it extends to politics.
• The Philosopher-Entrepreneur Reading List — the list this came from.