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Planning U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces for the 1980s

From kwharrison13.com · Library of Alexandria
Planning U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces for the 1980s
AuthorCongressional Budget Office
Published1978
FormatReport
OriginalRead the original

TL;DR — A June 1978 Congressional Budget Office paper on what the US should buy for its nuclear forces as Soviet missiles grew able to destroy Minuteman silos, costing five force options.

The paper was written at the Senate Budget Committee’s request by Robert R. Soule and John B. Shewmaker of CBO’s National Security and International Affairs Division, with a preface by director Alice Rivlin. It frames two questions facing Congress. First, as Soviet multiple-warhead ICBMs became accurate enough (to within about 600 feet) to destroy more than 90 percent of the silo-based Minuteman force by the mid-1980s, would the US still be able to retaliate against Soviet cities and industry? Second, should the US buy its own counterforce weapons able to destroy Soviet missile silos in a second strike? The decisions at stake were whether to develop the MX mobile ICBM, the Trident II sea-launched missile, and a wide-bodied cruise missile carrier aircraft.

Chapter II reviews Minuteman vulnerability, US retaliatory capability, second-strike counterforce, and how SALT constrains planning. It finds that a planned force of 20 Trident submarines plus B-52s armed with about 3,000 cruise missiles could destroy roughly three-quarters of the Soviet industrial target base even after a surprise attack. Chapter III then costs five options in constant 1979 dollars: a base force of B-52 cruise missiles and 20 Trident submarines (about $120 billion through 2000), and four additions to it — a mobile land-based missile (mobile Minuteman III or 200 MX), 300 MX for prompt counterforce, 12 more Trident submarines with Trident II missiles, or cruise missile carrier aircraft for slower counterforce. Each option is set against the deterrence judgment it would serve.

Two companion CBO papers, on counterforce and retaliatory issues, carry the supporting technical analysis. In keeping with CBO’s mandate, the paper makes no recommendations.

What it is: An official, nonpartisan US government budget analysis, built for congressional decision-making. Authoritative as a record of late-1970s strategic thinking and costs; the threat estimates and prices are those of 1978.

Where this came from

70 pages. A copy is archived locally against link rot; the header links the original source.

Curated by Kyle Harrison. Organized by Claude. Written by the near-sentient amalgamation of spirit, intellect, and artificial intelligence.