Knowledge and Justification
| Author | John L. Pollock |
|---|---|
| Published | 1974 |
| Format | Book |
| Original | Read the original |
TL;DR — John Pollock’s 1974 book arguing that concepts should be analysed by their justification conditions, not truth conditions, then applying that to perception, memory, induction and other minds.
Pollock’s preface sets out the problem: philosophy assumed a concept is analysed by stating its truth conditions, which pushed epistemology toward reductive programmes like phenomenalism and behaviourism, and those failed. He proposes instead to analyse concepts by the conditions under which believing them is justified, building on the “criteriological” theory from Wittgenstein and on Roderick Chisholm, whom he names as his closest ally. The first two chapters justify the method and set out a theory of reasons, including the idea of prima facie reasons that can be defeated.
The remaining chapters apply the method to standard problems. Chapters 3 to 6 cover perceptual knowledge (comparing naive realism, phenomenalism, scientific realism and direct realism), incorrigibility, perceptual attributes such as colour and shape, and how we reidentify physical objects over time. Chapter 7 treats memory and historical knowledge, chapter 8 induction and a theory of projectibility, chapter 9 knowledge of other minds and personal identity, and chapter 10 a priori knowledge, where Pollock argues openly for a Platonist view of concepts and propositions and against the idea that philosophy is only the analysis of language.
The book was published by Princeton University Press (preface dated Rochester, New York, November 1972) and grew out of several of Pollock’s journal articles. This PDF is posted on a site devoted to his work.
What it is: A serious, technical monograph in analytic epistemology from a university press. Demanding reading, written for philosophers.
Where this came from
- Will Manidis’s “most underrated PDF” thread, July 2023 — routing record: The Most Underrated PDF on the Internet (July 2023)
359 pages. A copy is archived locally against link rot; the header links the original source.