Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government
TL;DR — The September Dossier — the document that made the public case for the Iraq war, and was wrong.
With a foreword by the Prime Minister. September 2002.
The ‘September Dossier’: the UK government’s public assessment of Iraqi WMD, including the claim that weapons could be deployed within 45 minutes of an order.
The most consequential intelligence-assessment failure in modern British history. Two inquiries followed — Hutton and Butler — and then Chilcot, which found the judgements had been presented with “a certainty that was not justified.”
Essential reading as a primary source on how uncertainty gets stripped out of a document on its way to the public. Read against the ODNI attribution paper elsewhere in this collection, which is the same problem handled carefully.
Where this came from
55 pages. A copy is archived locally against link rot; the header links the original source.