Government Failure (Tullock)

A short introduction to public choice theory by three of its practitioners, published by the Cato Institute as a revision of the Institute of Economic Affairs volume Government, Whose Obedient Servant?. The organising move is to drop the assumption that officials pursue the public interest and to model politicians, bureaucrats and voters as self-interested in the same way market participants are. From that the book derives its standard results: rational ignorance among voters, log-rolling and vote trading, bureaucratic budget maximisation, rent-seeking and the Tullock-style analysis of the resources burned competing for a privilege, and regulatory capture. Tullock’s own contribution is the argument that the waste from rent-seeking can exceed the value of the rent being sought.

Why it’s on the list: McCord lists it second in Public Choice Theory, right after Buchanan’s “Public Choice: Politics without Romance” — the section that supplies the symmetry argument, that the case for government has to survive the same behavioural assumptions used to criticise markets.

Where I saw it: Brendan McCord’s Philosopher-Entrepreneur Reading List, in the Political Economy part, section Public Choice Theory — a structured curriculum shared on X on March 9, 2026 and saved to Kyle’s Apple Note “Books To Read”. The full 211-entry transcription is on The Philosopher-Entrepreneur Reading List.

Connections

• The Logic of Collective Action — Olson’s book, later in the same section of McCord’s list, and the foundation for the group-incentives half of the theory.
• Incentives — the analytical lever the whole field turns on.
• Government — the institution being modelled.
• Regulation — where the capture results bite.
• The Philosopher-Entrepreneur Reading List — the curriculum this came from.